Security Audit Report: Tempo Protocol

Security Audit Report: Tempo Protocol

By Kai Team2.02.2026

We ran Kai Agent against the Tempo Protocol repository, focusing on the TIP reference implementations including AccountKeychain and ValidatorConfig. The automated analysis discovered two vulnerabilities that were verified against the original codebase.

Executive Summary

MetricValue
Repositorytempoxyz/tempo
Contracts AnalyzedAccountKeychain, ValidatorConfig, TIP20
Exploit Candidates Found8
Verified Exploits2
Rejected (False Positives)6

Severity Breakdown

SeverityCount
Critical0
High1
Medium0
Low1
Informational0

Verified Vulnerabilities

[HIGH] Expired Access Keys Can Still Spend Tokens

Severity: High

Affected Contract: AccountKeychain.sol

Affected Function: _verifyAndUpdateSpending() (lines 252-287)

Vulnerability Class: Access Control

Description

The _verifyAndUpdateSpending function enforces revocation status and key existence but never checks if the key has expired. As a result, an access key remains usable after its expiry timestamp, allowing unauthorized spending.

Root Cause Analysis

The function performs these checks:

  1. If keyId is the main key (address(0)) - returns early
  2. If key is revoked (isRevoked) - reverts with KeyAlreadyRevoked
  3. If key exists (expiry > 0) - reverts with KeyNotFound
  4. If limits are enforced (enforceLimits) - returns early if not
  5. If spending limit is sufficient - reverts with SpendingLimitExceeded

Missing Check: There is NO check for block.timestamp >= key.expiry.

Compare with updateSpendingLimit() (lines 157-162) which correctly includes:

solidity
// Check if key has expired
if (block.timestamp >= key.expiry) {
    revert KeyExpired();
}

Impact

  • Attack Vector: Any user with an expired access key
  • Economic Feasibility: High - attacker can spend up to the full remaining spending limit after key expiration
  • Potential Loss: Full remaining spending limit of expired keys

Attack Scenario:

  1. Account owner grants an access key to an employee with 30-day expiry and 1000 token limit
  2. Employee uses 500 tokens during their employment
  3. After 30 days, the key should be unusable
  4. However, the employee can still spend the remaining 500 tokens using the expired key

Proof of Concept

solidity
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity >=0.8.28 <0.9.0;

import "forge-std/Test.sol";
import "src/AccountKeychain.sol";

contract AccountKeychainHarness is AccountKeychain {
    function setTransactionKey(address keyId) external {
        _setTransactionKey(keyId);
    }

    function verifyAndUpdateSpending(address account, address keyId, address token, uint256 amount)
        external
    {
        _verifyAndUpdateSpending(account, keyId, token, amount);
    }
}

contract ExpiredKeySpendingTest is Test {
    AccountKeychainHarness keychain;

    function setUp() public {
        keychain = new AccountKeychainHarness();
    }

    function test_expired_key_can_still_spend() public {
        address keyId = address(0xBEEF);
        address token = address(0xCAFE);

        IAccountKeychain.TokenLimit[] memory limits = new IAccountKeychain.TokenLimit[](1);
        limits[0] = IAccountKeychain.TokenLimit({token: token, amount: 100});

        // authorize key with short expiry
        keychain.authorizeKey(
            keyId,
            IAccountKeychain.SignatureType.Secp256k1,
            uint64(block.timestamp + 1),
            true,
            limits
        );

        // move time past expiry
        vm.warp(block.timestamp + 2);

        // Protocol-level spending check should fail for expired keys,
        // but it succeeds because expiry is never checked.
        keychain.verifyAndUpdateSpending(address(this), keyId, token, 10);

        // Remaining limit reduced, proving spending succeeded after expiry.
        uint256 remaining = keychain.getRemainingLimit(address(this), keyId, token);
        assertEq(remaining, 90);
    }
}

Recommended Fix

Add an expiry check in _verifyAndUpdateSpending:

diff
--- src/AccountKeychain.sol
+++ src/AccountKeychain.sol
@@ -269,6 +269,11 @@
             revert KeyNotFound();
         }

+        // Check if key has expired
+        if (block.timestamp >= key.expiry) {
+            revert KeyExpired();
+        }
+
         // If enforceLimits is false, this key has unlimited spending
         if (!key.enforceLimits) {
             return;

[LOW] Validator Can Evade Deactivation via Address Rotation Front-Running

Severity: Low

Affected Contract: ValidatorConfig.sol

Affected Function: changeValidatorStatus() (lines 142-149)

Vulnerability Class: Front-Running

Description

The changeValidatorStatus(address validator, bool active) function is vulnerable to front-running because validators can rotate to a new address via updateValidator(). A validator can preempt an admin's deactivation by changing its address, causing changeValidatorStatus on the old address to revert with ValidatorNotFound.

Root Cause Analysis

  1. updateValidator() allows validators to rotate to a new address (line 113-124)
  2. When rotating, the old address entry is deleted: delete validators[msg.sender]
  3. changeValidatorStatus(address) checks if validator exists at that specific address
  4. If the address was rotated, the check fails and reverts

Existing Mitigation: The contract provides changeValidatorStatusByIndex(uint64 index, bool active) which uses the validator's index (preserved during rotation) and would successfully deactivate the validator regardless of address rotation.

Impact

  • Attack Vector: Validator monitors mempool and front-runs deactivation
  • Economic Feasibility: Yes - minimal gas cost
  • Attacker Profit: No direct profit - griefing attack to temporarily evade deactivation
  • Mitigation Exists: Admin can use changeValidatorStatusByIndex instead

Proof of Concept

solidity
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.13;

import "forge-std/Test.sol";
import "src/ValidatorConfig.sol";
import "src/interfaces/IValidatorConfig.sol";

contract ValidatorStatusFrontRunTest is Test {
    ValidatorConfig config;

    address admin = address(0xA11CE);
    address validator1 = address(0xB0B);
    address validator2 = address(0xC0C);

    function setUp() public {
        config = new ValidatorConfig(admin);

        vm.prank(admin);
        config.addValidator(
            validator1,
            bytes32(uint256(1)),
            true,
            "host:1234",
            "1.2.3.4:1234"
        );
    }

    function testValidatorCanEvadeDeactivationByRotatingAddress() public {
        // Validator front-runs by rotating to a new address
        vm.prank(validator1);
        config.updateValidator(
            validator2,
            bytes32(uint256(2)),
            "host:1234",
            "1.2.3.4:1234"
        );

        // Admin attempts to deactivate old address, but it no longer exists
        vm.prank(admin);
        vm.expectRevert(IValidatorConfig.ValidatorNotFound.selector);
        config.changeValidatorStatus(validator1, false);

        // Validator remains active at the new address
        (, bool active, , , , ) = config.validators(validator2);
        assertTrue(active, "validator should remain active after rotation");
    }
}

Recommended Fix

Track validator addresses historically to resolve rotated addresses:

diff
--- src/ValidatorConfig.sol
+++ src/ValidatorConfig.sol
@@ -20,6 +20,9 @@

     /// @notice Mapping from validator address to validator info
     mapping(address => Validator) public validators;
+
+    /// @notice Mapping from current or historical validator address to validator index + 1
+    mapping(address => uint256) private validatorIndexByAddress;

     /// @notice The epoch at which a fresh DKG ceremony will be triggered
     uint64 private nextDkgCeremony;
@@ -82,6 +85,9 @@
             outboundAddress: outboundAddress
         });

+        // Track the validator index for address lookups
+        validatorIndexByAddress[newValidatorAddress] = uint256(validatorCount) + 1;
+
         // Add to array
         validatorsArray.push(newValidatorAddress);

@@ -127,6 +133,9 @@
         _validateHostPort(inboundAddress, "inboundAddress");
         _validateIpPort(outboundAddress, "outboundAddress");

+        // Track the validator index for address lookups
+        validatorIndexByAddress[newValidatorAddress] = uint256(oldValidator.index) + 1;
+
         // Store updated validator
         validators[newValidatorAddress] = Validator({
             publicKey: publicKey,
@@ -142,7 +151,23 @@
     function changeValidatorStatus(address validator, bool active) external onlyOwner {
         // Check if validator exists
         if (validators[validator].publicKey == bytes32(0)) {
-            revert ValidatorNotFound();
+            uint256 indexPlusOne = validatorIndexByAddress[validator];
+            if (indexPlusOne == 0) {
+                revert ValidatorNotFound();
+            }
+
+            uint64 index = uint64(indexPlusOne - 1);
+            if (index >= validatorsArray.length) {
+                revert ValidatorNotFound();
+            }
+
+            address validatorAddress = validatorsArray[index];
+            if (validators[validatorAddress].publicKey == bytes32(0)) {
+                revert ValidatorNotFound();
+            }
+
+            validators[validatorAddress].active = active;
+            return;
         }

         validators[validator].active = active;

Rejected Findings (False Positives)

The following 6 exploit candidates were investigated but rejected:

FindingReason
TIP20 Fee Manager optedInSupply InflationRequires control of TIP_FEE_MANAGER precompile address (0xfeEC...) - not controllable by external attackers
TIP20 Fee Refund InconsistencyDid not compile - missing dependencies
TIP20 actualUsed MismatchDid not compile - missing dependencies
TIP20 Negative Fee via BufferNo verdict - incomplete analysis
TIP20 Self-Transfer InflationDuplicate of Fee Manager finding

Methodology

Kai Agent uses a multi-phase security analysis pipeline:

  1. Setup: Repository cloned, dependencies installed, contracts compiled
  2. Static Analysis: Control flow analysis, entry point identification
  3. Invariant Discovery: Security properties extracted from code patterns
  4. Mission Dispatch: Targeted analysis of access control, expiry handling, admin functions
  5. Exploit Generation: Foundry PoC tests written for each candidate
  6. Verification: Tests compiled and executed - only passing tests with real implementations qualify
  7. Fix Generation: Patches generated and validated against the PoC

Verification Against Original Code

Both vulnerabilities were verified against the original Tempo repository:

  • Files compared: AccountKeychain.sol, ValidatorConfig.sol
  • Result: IDENTICAL to modified test repository
  • Confidence: Vulnerabilities exist in production code

Conclusion

This audit discovered two vulnerabilities in the Tempo protocol:

  1. High Severity: Missing expiry check in _verifyAndUpdateSpending allows expired access keys to continue spending tokens. This defeats the security purpose of key expiration and should be fixed immediately.

  2. Low Severity: Validators can front-run deactivation by rotating addresses. A workaround exists (changeValidatorStatusByIndex), but the address-based function should be hardened for defense in depth.

The high-severity finding represents a significant access control bypass where time-limited permissions can be used indefinitely. The fix is straightforward - adding the same expiry check that exists in related functions.


Generated by Kai Agent.

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